This paper analyzes of two kinds of Internet interconnection arrangements: peering relationships between core Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and transit sales by core ISPs to other ISPs. Core backbone providers jointly produce an intermediate output --full routing capability --in an upstream market. All ISPs use this input to produce Internet-based services for end users in a downstream market. It is argued that a vertical market structure with relatively few core ISPs can be relatively efficient given the technological economies of scale and transaction costs arising from Internet addressing and routing. The analysis of costs identifies instances in which an incumbent core ISP's refusal to peer with a rival or potential rival might promote economic efficiency. A separate bargaining analysis of peering relationships identifies conditions under which a core ISP might be able to use its larger size and associated network effects to refuse to peer with a rival, thus raising its rival's costs and ultimately increasing prices to end users. An economic analysis of competitive harm arising from refusals to peer should consider cost-based, efficiency-enhancing justifications as well as attempts to raise rivals' costs.
Introduction
This paper describes the technology and organization of Internet services markets and analyses how peering arrangements among core Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can affect efficiency and competition in these markets.
In the present market organization, a limited number of core ISPs exchange traffic with each other at private and public Internet exchanges. The arrangements among the core ISPs have two key features: each core ISP negotiates a separate interconnection arrangement with each other core ISP, and each accepts only traffic destined to one of its own customers.
These peering arrangements result in the creation of full routing tables, which define the set of addresses that can be reached over the Internet. A much larger number of non-core ISPs enter into different arrangements for exchanging traffic, in which they purchase transit from core ISPs, who then accept traffic destined for any Internet address. Thus, the market for Internet services has a vertical structure in which core ISPs produce an intermediate output (full routing capability or core Internet service) that is used by them and by non-core ISPs to produce Internet services for end users.
A core ISP is one that maintains a full Internet routing table. To accomplish this, the core ISPs maintain peering relationships with all other core ISPs. When a core ISP refuses to renew an existing peering arrangement or establish a new one, anti-competitive behavior may be alleged by the refused ISP. This paper develops an analytical framework that can be used to evaluate such allegations.
In Section 2, we analyze the technology of packet routing for Internet services.
Combining that analysis with a transaction costs analysis, we conclude in Section 3 that the cost-minimizing industry organization must consist essentially of a limited number of core ISPs who supply transit to a larger number of non-core ISPs. From this perspective, refusals to peer can sometimes be consistent with and even necessary for cost minimization in the provision of Internet services.
While Section 3 is devoted to an analysis of costs, Section 4 focuses on revenues to see whether direct bargaining among ISPs is likely to result in efficient peering relationships and competitive prices. This section assumes that all costs are zero. With zero costs, a billand-keep arrangement, in which neither core ISP pays the other for interconnection, is the cost-based, competitive benchmark. A simple bargaining model is used to determine sufficient conditions for bill-and-keep to be the equilibrium outcome when two core ISPs negotiate an interconnection arrangement. With realistic extensions of the simple model it is found that a large core ISP may have the incentive and ability to raise the price of peering to smaller core ISPs. Because costs are zero, refusals to peer on a bill-and-keep basis are anticompetitive, and, unlike the cost-based refusals of Section 2, do not increase economic efficiency.
In an antirust analysis of a refusal to peer, the central question is whether the refusal was a cost-based decision that may have served to maintain quality in the pool of core ISPs or an anti-competitive act that could raise prices paid by end users. A concluding section summarizes this paper's bearing on that question.
The Technology of Providing Internet Services
The Internet is an interconnected global network of computer networks based on the Internet Protocol (IP). The seamless interconnection of the Internet's constituent networks permits any subscriber to communicate with any other subscriber, regardless of the ISP from which the subscribers obtain their Internet connections. This seamless connectivity is the result of reciprocal and non-reciprocal interconnection arrangements negotiated by ISPs, and is strongly influenced by the capabilities and limitations of key Internet standards and technologies. 1
To provide a basis for examining the structure of the interconnection agreements, we begin with a brief overview of Internet addresses and routing. 2 We then discuss factors that give rise to a hierarchy of core and non-core ISPs.
Internet Addressing
An IP address is a 32-bit string of zeros and ones. Traditionally, IP addresses belonged to one of three primary classes: A, B, and C. Class A addresses begin with a '0'; the first 8 bits (the net ID) identify the network, and the remaining 24 bits (the host ID) The acquisition of proper routes and the maintenance of accurate routing tables are critical functions of routing protocols and router management. 6 We focus on key differences between unsophisticated routers that use default routing and core routers capable of defaultfree or full routing.
Default Routing
Conceptually, a routing consuming router resources and resulting in greater congestion. There is also an increased likelihood that packets routed with partial information will follow longer paths than routers with complete information on all destinations.
Core Routers
ISPs have adopted a coherent and workable routing scheme by designating a set of core routers, none of which relies on default routes. Core routers typically process packets destined from one network to another, basing their routing decisions on the net ID of the destination. When a core router encounters an unknown destination address, it does not point to a default router, but drops the packet and returns an error message to the source.
The set of full routes contained in the core routers' tables defines the reach of the Internet. Each device associated with an IP address (or net ID) stored in the core routers'
tables can communicate with all other devices associated with IP addresses in those tables. A device that is not associated with any IP address in the full routing table will be invisible to a large portion of the Internet. Given the rapid expansion of the Internet, maintenance of the core routing tables is a critical and demanding task for the core ISPs.
Border Gateway Protocol version 4 (BGP4) is used by core routers to develop their full routing tables. A greatly simplified description of this protocol is provided below. Core
ISPs establish "peering sessions" between pairs of routers. When a peering session is initiated, each router announces (or sends to the other router) its initial routing table: the destinations or routes it can reach directly, the distance in hops to these routes (zero), and the router on the next hop (itself). When each router receives the other's routing table, it updates its own routing table to show the additional routes, noting that they are one hop away and that they can be reached through the other router. In case the two routers peer only with each other, a single update is sufficient to provide each router with a complete routing table.
When a router peers with more than one other router, a more complex series of updates is necessary for the routers to converge to a consistent set of full routes. The routing tables are constantly updated as new customers with new addresses join the Internet, and as existing customers switch providers or drop off the Internet. The of BGP4 is its ability to automate the propagation of route changes throughout the Internet is attractive and dangerous.
Routing Among Core ISPs
Using BGP4, ISPs can engage in "policy routing": designating preferred routes, limiting the routes they announce to a peering router, and limiting route announcements that they will accept from a peering router. Policy routing provides some support for two interconnection arrangements prevalent in the U.S. Internet: transit arrangements and peering.
In transit arrangements, one ISP pays the other to provide connectivity to all addresses in the Internet. The ISP supplying transit accepts packets from the purchaser addressed to any Internet destination and delivers packets addressed to the purchaser from any Internet source. The purchasing ISP will typically configure its routers to point a default route at the transit supplier.
In peering relationships between two ISPs, each ISP accepts packets addressed to, and delivers packets from, its customers (i.e., the end users and the ISPs who purchase connectivity from it). Neither ISP points a default route at the other. ISPs in peering relationships typically "bill-and-keep" and do not make payments to one another.
In general, it is difficult and costly for a core ISP to ensure that its peers are adhering to the terms of the peering relationship and not surreptitiously pointing a default route at it.
In practice, trust must often a substitute for verification. According to some ISPs, this trust is sometimes abused. 7
7 Recent discussion on an email list points out the need for, and availability of, prototype software that can be used by an ISP to detect whether another ISP has pointed a default route at it or used it for transit when it is not authorized to do so. See the thread: "Some abuse detection hacks …" at http://www.merit.edu/mail.archives/html/nanog/maillist. Also see The Cook Report, Gordon Cook, "Randy Bush on Technical Peering Issues", pages 9-13, available from http://www.cookreport.com.
Technical Efficiency of the Routing Hierarchy
The continued rapid growth of the Internet has generated an urgent need to adopt routing arrangements that economize on equipment investment, maintenance, and communications capacity and that are also flexible and responsive to changing circumstances. The system has evolved a relatively cost-efficient, hierarchical set of ISP relationships. The second is the "transaction costs" approach, which compares costs across various forms of organization, holding the technology constant. In its purest form, the transaction cost approach demands that claims about the effects of organization on technology be justified by comparing the transactional problems created by different forms of organization.
For example, it may lead one to ask why there should be any difference at all between what 8 This assumption was not satisfied by the first Internet interconnection arrangement linking commercial ISPs together. In that arrangement members of the Commercial Internet Exchange (CIX) exchanged packets through the CIX router, which was under the control of the CIX membership. The history of the CIX, which is not reviewed here, offers hints about the difficulties of shared ownership of routing equipment and the reasons why backbone providers now own and operate separate routers.
can be technically implemented by a single centralized system manager and what can be implemented by a set of independent core ISPs.
Our discussion in this section incorporates elements from both approaches. We consider economies of scale in coordinating and operating the system (technological considerations) as well as the need to minimize free-riding, overcome network externalities, and encourage coordination on standards (transaction cost considerations). We do not, however, attempt to explain the relationship between technology and market organization;
rather, we treat the existing, consistent empirical pattern as an input to our analysis.
Economies of Scale
The cost of core routing, holding other factors constant, is likely to be sub-additive. 9
To see why, hold the number of end users and the volume of end user traffic constant. As the number of core ISPs increases, the number of core routers, each of which contains entries for all Internet routes, also increases. Moreover, more skilled personnel are necessary to maintain and manage core routers, as the maintenance of consistent routes is more difficult when there are more sources of route announcements, and more potential sources of error.
Consequently, total industry-wide expenditure on core routing increases.
9 Subadditive cost functions imply that one firm can produce any given level of industry output at lower cost than multiple firms can. See William W. Sharkey, The Theory of Natural Monopoly, Cambridge University Press, 1982, page 2. We assume in this analysis that interconnection between separate ISPs must respect existing negotiated standards and take place only at public interconnection points while interconnection among nodes of a single ISP can be engineered at the ISP's discretion.
The costs at public interconnection points also rise with the number of core ISPs.
Each core ISP leases a link (such as a private line) from each public interconnection point to a nearby network node. A fully meshed network would require that regional ISPs establish nodes near public interexchanges or lease expensive long distance links from one of their network nodes to the public interconnection point. The multiplicity of long and relatively low bandwidth links would cost more than the relatively short, high-bandwidth links from a few core ISPs to a public interconnection point. In addition, since each core router must communicate its routes to every other core router, the number of routing messages exchanged increases with the number of core routers. The increased routing traffic occupies more capacity in the shared media over which the peering routers communicate and increases in usage-sensitive costs. Higher speed LANs may be needed at public interexchange points to accommodate a larger number of core ISPs.
If core ISPs seek to avoid the higher costs of shared interconnection media by using private interconnections, as they have done in the U.S., cost subadditivity emerges for a different reason. In this case, each core ISP must establish links between its core routers and core routers of other ISPs. The interconnection links are often private lines connecting the core routers. The larger the number of core ISPs, the larger the number of links and associated router interfaces required. The costs of these additional resources will raise unit costs, implying that the industry would have lower costs (other things equal) if it had fewer core ISPs. 10
Limiting the number of core ISPs and core routers might enhance efficiency. Indeed, Comer concludes, "Core systems work best for internets that have a single, centrally managed backbone". 11
Coordination on Standards and Business Practices
As a network of networks, the Internet depends on coordination on for its success.
The value of access to a given subscriber depends on the size of the whole network. Thus, the compatibility of, and interconnection among, networks increases the value of access to all subscribers. 12 However, compatibility and interconnection require coordination and cooperation particularly when technologies advance rapidly. Therefore, arguments based on network externalities might be used to justify coordination among ISPs. It is an accepted principle of transaction costs theory that coordination (and consensus) are easier to achieve 10 Of course, a single company needs to connect its routers as well, but multiple core routers incur unnecessary duplication, for two reasons. First, unlike separate ISPs, a single ISP could consolidate its operations to avoid having two routers in locations in a single neighborhood. Second, even if two routers in one neighborhood were necessary, both need not be core routers. One could be a smaller router pointing a default route to the other (core) router. The savings in router management costs from having with a single router with an external BGP4 connection might be substantial. 
Coordination on Router Management
Inefficient management of a core router by an ISP can impose significant external costs on other ISPs. Core routers exchange information with one another on how efficiently they can reach given destinations: in one hop, two hops, etc. Each core router uses the information received from other the core routers, combined with a measure of network distance, to build an efficient routing table that is consistent with the routing tables of other core routers.
When one core router sends incorrect information, all other core routers will build inaccurate routing tables, and all customers will experience degraded service (such as lost connectivity). Global problems can arise from local mistakes. Route flapping occurs when a router repeatedly announces and then withdraws a route. This initiates a series of upgrade messages which may cause routers to experience difficulty in converging on stable routing tables. The resources required to process these routing messages and compute routing tables can significantly limit the router's ability to forward packets, degrading service to end users.
A different global problem, black-holing, occurs when an ISP mistakenly announces a route that it cannot reach. Packets for the announced destination are sent to the ISP making the false announcement, but discarded because the ISP cannot reach the destination. Both these problems affect the services offered by the ISP and also the services offered by all other ISPs.
All ISPs have an incentive to correct these routing problems. ISPs with staff skilled in routing and router management are likely to solve a routing problem quickly. However, the solution will be of limited value unless all ISPs who exchange routing information implement it. Therefore, the solution must be shared with all core ISPs, including those with unskilled routing staff, or no routing staff whatsoever. However, this externality blunts the incentive to hire competent routing technicians, reducing the quality of service. The effects can be diminished by limiting membership in the core set to a limited number of ISPs with demonstrated routing expertise. Refusals by incumbents to peer with new entrants who lack the required routing skills can thus increase the overall efficiency of the Internet.
Free Riding on Backbones
The Internet routing architecture also provides incentives for ISPs to free-ride on their competitors' backbones. Consider a simple case in which two core ISPs interconnect on a bill and keep basis at two interconnection or interexchange points (IXs), one on the East A core ISP might have to audit every other core ISP's route announcements to ensure that it was not being gamed in this fashion. However, the auditing, monitoring and enforcement costs arising from gaming may be quite high, and since monitoring tools are imperfect, some free-riding may occur even when monitoring tools are used. 16 In sum, a hierarchical structure in which a few core ISPs peer with each other to produce full routing capability and supply transit services to a large number of other ISPs is likely to be more cost-efficient than a flatter structure in which a large number of ISPs peer with one another to produce full routes. The socially optimal number of core ISPs is likely to be a relatively small subset of all ISPs, of which there are more than 5,000 in the U.S. Over time, the set of core ISPs may shrink, and the composition of the set may change as new entrants succeed in becoming core ISPs and others exit the market. In such a dynamic environment such as this, it is inevitable that some new ISPs may not be able to obtain peering arrangements with all incumbent core ISPs on satisfactory terms, and some core ISPs may not be able to renew all their peering arrangements. Some refusals to peer (with incumbents or with new entrants) might help maintain the economically efficient interconnection arrangements discussed in this section.
A Bargaining Approach to Peering Arrangements
Bargaining theory comes in two flavors: the older "cooperative bargaining theory" initiated by John Nash and the newer "non-cooperative bargaining theory" initiated by Jacob
Stahl and rediscovered by Ariel Rubinstein. These two theories are closely connected: the Stahl-Rubinstein model duplicates the results of Nash bargaining theory under appropriate circumstances.
The older cooperative bargaining theory takes opportunity sets (that is, possible bargains) and threat points as its primitive elements. The threat points are conceptually problematic in the cooperative theory, for two reasons. First, the theory offers no way of assessing which threats are credible. Second, it it fails to distinguish between threat payoff that arises from taking outside opportunities to one from a temporary disagreement.
Non-cooperative bargaining theory is more specific, assigning different roles to outside options and costs incurred during disagreement. 17 It is also more flexible, offering a straightforward way to explore variations of the basic bargaining environment using the standard tools of non-cooperative game theory.
One of the greatest difficulties in applying bargaining theory comes from determining which threats are credible. Unfortunately, non-cooperative bargaining theory indicates that credibility is not merely a theoretical issue. For example, a labor union can decide whether its members will work during each period of a negotiation. Both sides incur large losses if the union strikes. By varying the parties' expectations about the conditions under which the union will strike or accept the firm's offer, Fernandez and Glaser show that there is a wide range of possible equilibrium outcomes. 18 Here, "equilibrium" means that (1) each party always acts optimally in its own interests, given its expectations and (2) its expectations are correct (in the sense that they correspond to the other party's planned behavior).
The existence of many equilibrium outcomes illustrates that bargaining outcomes are partly determined by history and culture, which affect expectations. To the extent that a core ISP with market power has exploited its position in the past by refusing to peer with a 17 "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling" by Ken Binmore, Ariel Rubinstein, and Asher Wolinsky, Rand Journal of Economics, Volume 17, No. 2, Summer 1986, demonstrates the distinct roles and also the close connection between the new theory and the older Nash bargaining theory.
requesting ISP, such behavior should be expected in the future whenever it is consistent with that ISP's rational self-interest.
However, the threat of refusing to peer does not always empower a dominant network carrier to raise its interconnection price. 19 As the analysis below shows, other conditions are necessary for the exercise of market power even in a simple model.
A simple bargaining model
The and conducting the analysis in terms of f.
Suppose that one core ISP serves a fraction α 1 of the customers and a second serves a fraction α 2 , and that these proportions are independent of the interconnection arrangements 19 An historical case in point is the arrangement reached in 19993 by ANS and the CIX. Although ANS, which operated the NSFNET, was the dominant carrier, it was forced to agree to the bill and keep arrangement proposed by the smaller CIX networks in order to provide the universal connectivity it had guaranteed to its customers. 20 We assume that the customers of ISP i include those who purchase service directly from ISP i and also the customers of all non-core ISPs who purchase transit through ISP i . Suppose the lack of interconnection is sustained only temporarily during bargaining, until the parties reach a peering agreement. The outcome of negotiations according to the non-cooperative theory (assuming identical discount rates for the two ISPs) is essentially the same as that of Nash bargaining theory with the no-interconnection payoffs as the threat point. The outcome is that the two parties divide the gains to cooperation equally, and the payoffs are:
ISP 1 :
ISP 2 :
With interconnection, ISP 1 will be able to charge each of its customers a subscription fee of f(1), earning revenues (and profits) of π 1 =Nα 1 f(1). In equilibrium, the payoff to ISP 1 is given by equation (1). The difference between the two payoffs is the negotiated net payment from ISP 1 to ISP 2 . Since there are no costs in the formal model, such payments cannot be justified on the basis of costs imposed by one ISP on the other and thus a positive 21 The implications of costs for peering arrangements were separately analyzed in Section 2.
net payment can be attributed to the exercise of market power. With some manipulation, the net payment can be shown to be:
The first term is the additional revenue that ISP 1 earns from its end users after it negotiates an interconnection arrangement with ISP 2 . The second term is the corresponding expression for During early stages of market development when very few consumers have obtained Internet access, f may be almost linear so the simple model suggests that bill-and-keep arrangements should be relatively common. As market penetration increases, the value of connecting to additional subscribers may be subject to diminishing returns, and the relatively large core ISPs, whose own customers have a low marginal value of communicating with additional subscribers, may gain a bargaining advantage. This conclusion is consistent with the early history of Internet interconnection arrangements. 22
Variations on the Simple Model
The preceding conclusion is derived jointly from the several assumptions of the the simple model by assuming that α i is independent of the number of subscribers that can be reached through ISP i . If switching costs were low, the smaller network would lose at least some customers after being disconnected by the larger network and its profits at the threat point would be lower than they were in the simple model. The ability of subscribers to switch ISPs could weaken the bargaining position of the smaller network.
A second critical assumption is that there is only one source for the services provided by each ISP. A core ISP's ability to demand payment from another core ISP for connections to its customers depends on the absence of alternative routes to reach the same customers.
Some downstream ISPs and large business customers purchase connectivity from two or more ISPs --they multihome. Multihoming is technically complex and can be quite costly;
only some customers are capable of taking advantage of the benefits it provides. However, the costs of multihoming are falling as new technologies such as Network Address
Translation tools (NAT) are deployed. 23 Residential customers can similarly achieve a degree of independence by obtaining ISP-independent email accounts from providers such as Hotmail and Yahoo in addition to their ISP's email accounts. These forms of multihoming have an impact on the bargaining power of core ISPs. If all of the customers of one core ISP could be reached through other core ISPs, then that ISP's threat to withhold interconnection would not be credible.
A third assumption is that an agreement, once reached, is sustained indefinitely. The smaller core ISPs could have an incentive to merge to reduce their disadvantages in case their peering arrangements are threatened and so to increase their bargaining power. The Brokered Private Peering Group (BPPG) is one attempt at such a consolidation. 24 These firms may also have a dynamic incentive to expand to improve their bargaining position (though this must be balanced against the static incentive to shrink if there are increased variable connection costs). These growth incentives would inevitably cut into the larger core ISP's current profits. However, the large core ISP could not alter these incentives merely by forbearing from exercising its market power in the present, because a promise to continue forbearance is not credible. In this case, the desire to maintain a cooperative reputation is not likely to be an effective limit on the dominant ISP's behavior.
These considerations taken together suggest that, under some circumstances, large core ISPs may exercise market power in their negotiations with smaller ISPs by refusing to enter into, or to extend, peering arrangements with them. The emergence of a core ISP that is significantly larger than the others may harm competition. The larger ISP will have a bargaining advantage over its smaller rivals and can force them to pay interconnection fees that exceed the costs of interconnection. These fees may then have to be recovered by the smaller core ISPs through higher end user charges and by higher prices for transit charged to non-core ISPs.
One safeguard against this exercise of market power is vigorous competition among core ISPs. The simple bargaining model suggests that core ISPs of comparable size will enter into bill-and-keep arrangements, and no core ISP will then be able to raise its rivals'
costs by raising the price of interconnection. At the same time, each core ISP will have an incentive to gain as many end users and non-core ISP customers as possible in order to maintain or improve its peering arrangements. Competition for these customers will tend to keep prices for transit and Internet service to end users low.
Conclusions
Our economic analysis of Internet interconnection concludes that routing costs are lower in a hierarchy in which a relatively small number of core ISPs interconnect with each other to provide full routing service to themselves and to non-core ISPs. Transaction costs analysis suggests that the market organization will mirror the routing hierarchy, as it does in current practice. In this hierarchy, refusals to enter into or renew peering arrangements can lead to lower routing costs and contribute to economic efficiency.
Routing costs, however, are not the whole story; account must also be taken of how peering decisions can affect the core ISPs' market power and consumer prices. A simple bargaining model of peering arrangements suggests that so long as there is a sufficient number of core ISPs of roughly comparable size that compete vigorously for market share in order to maintain their bill-and-keep interconnection arrangements, the prices of transit and
Internet service to end users will be close to cost. If one core ISP can grow sufficiently larger than the others can and if customer switching during periods of disagreement is likely, then
